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Current Theories on Expert and
Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty
Considers the Implications for Legal
Education
John B. Mitchell
Most law professors are puzzled by the same basic questions. How can we
do what we do with such ease, when so many of our students seem to
struggle (particularly in the first year) with what appears to be relatively
uncomplex analysis? (Are we really that much smarter than them?) Why do
students (at least initially) give so many "off the wall" answers; and why do
some, who otherwise appear intelligent and who even may have been
successful in another field, never seem to catch on? Why do students who
have succeeded in college and perhaps even in another graduate program
seem to experience a breakdown in the most basic powers of simple logic,
common sense, and clear expression when they enter law school; and why
do they seem to go through such emotional trauma even though, in truth,
few of us are Professor Kingsfields in class?
Where can we find answers? Current cognitive and developmental
theories of novice and expert thinking may provide insights that can guide
our teaching. Although scattered references to educational psychology and
learning theory have slowly begun to appear in isolated articles in our
literature,' the ideas have not yet become a central focus in discussions of
legal education.
John B. Mitchell is Scholar-in-Residence, University of Puget Sound School of Law. This
article represents the shared endeavor of a full faculty; Chris-Rideout, Marilyn Berger, David
Boerner, Joel Eichengrun, and Pierre Schlag added editorial and substantive insights that
greatly improved the final product.
1. For example, the ideas of B. F. Skinner and behaviorist theory on stimulus-response
bonds are briefly discussed in Charles D. Kelso, The 1981 AALS Conference on
Teaching Contracts: A Summary and Appraisal, 32 J. Legal Educ. 616, 633 (1982);
concepts from learning theory concerning "generalizing" from experience are mentioned in E. Walter Van Valkenburg, Law Teachers, Law Students, and Litigation, 34J.
Legal Educ. 584, 602 (1984); the developmental psychologists Erikson, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Perry are discussed in a footnote in James R. Elkins, Rites de Passage: Law
Students "Telling Their Lives," 35 J. Legal Educ. 27,30 n.9 (1985); citations to works on
theories of mastery learning can be found in Jay M. Feinman & Marc Feldman,
Achieving Excellence: Mastery Learning in Legal Education, 35 J. Legal Educ. 528, 530
n.5 (1985); educational research from other fields is used to discuss the efficacy of
various teaching methods in Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is
There a Case Against the Case Method? 36 J. Legal Educ. 163, 173, 174 (1986);
educational research on what it requires to make a skill "transferable" is mentioned in
John 0. Mudd, Beyond Rationalism: Performance-Referenced Legal Education, 36 J.
Legal Educ. 189, 201 (1986); learning theory on use of the visual senses and retention
is pointed out in Vincent Robert Johnson, Audio Visual Enhancement of Classroom
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The following article discusses various learning theories and then
chronicles a variety of ideas that apply the theories to our teaching. The
ideas are not mine alone but rather reflect the ponderings of nearly twenty
faculty members at the University of Puget Sound School of Law. 2 Some
ideas represent initial impressions and are presented in a short paragraph
without further elaboration. Others are more fully conceived. They represent the views of individual faculty members (most of whom are traditional
Socratic teachers) and do not reflect any sort of faculty consensus. In fact,
throughout the institution there aye faculty members who would disagree-with various levels of intensity-with one or more of the ideas presented.
That is how it should be in an institution in which the free and open
exchange of ideas is so central. For what is a school but a place to learn,
question, and ultimately learn through questioning?

Teaching: A Primer for Law Professors, 37 J. Legal Educ. 97, 100 n.14 (1987);
theapplication of experimental learning theory in Paul Bergman, Avrom Sherr & Roger
Burridge, Learning From Experience: Nonlegally-Specific Role Plays, 37 J. Legal Educ.
535, 536 (1987); Carol Gilligan's theories on women's ways of knowing are discussed in
Paul Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory, and Practice in Law School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. Legal Educ. 243,
247 (1988). In addition, for many years, Michael Josephson has lectured on legal
education using "Bloom's Taxonomy" (Benjamin S. Bloom, Max D. Englehart, Edward
J. Furst, Walker H. Hill & David R. Krathwhol, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives,
Handbook I: Cognitive Domain (New York, 1956) [hereinafter Bloom] as a major
foundation for his presentation. Finally, the president of AALS, Richard G. Huber,
discussed the importance of learning theory for our profession in the President's
Message, Newsletter (September, 1988).
2. The ideas did not spring forth in a vacuum but are the products of a fermentation that
began at a day-long workshop in which twenty members of the faculty discussed relevant
theoretical background literature, engaged in various exercises, and heard presentations
covering current theories on reasoning and education as applied to expert and novice
learning. The faculty was joined in the workshop by Joseph Williams, professor of
linguistics and rhetoic at the University of Chicago. Williams is a cofounder of the
nationally acclaimed series of annual conferences on teaching "higher-order reasoning
and thinking critically" at the University of Chicago. Our background readings included
Richard C. Anderson, The Notion of Schemata and the Educational Enterprise, in
Schooling and the Acquisition of Knowledge, ed. Richard C. Anderson, Rand J. Spiro &
William E. Montague, 415 (Hillsdale, N.J., 1977); Robert Glasser, Education and
Thinking: The Role of Knowledge, 39 Am. Psychologist 93 (1984); James F. Voss, Telly
R. Greene, Timothy R. Post & Barbara C. Penner, Problem-Solving Skill in the Social
Sciences [hereinafter Problem-Solving Skill], in 17 The Psychology of Learning and
Motivation 165, ed. Gordon H. Bower (New York, 1983); David N. Perkins, Reasoning
As Imagination, 16 Interchange 14 (1985).
The full faculty at the time this article was written numbered over forty and included
James Bond, Dean, and the following professors and legal writing instructors (in
alphabetical order): Barbara Barker, James Beaver, Marilyn Berger, David Boerner,
Doug Branson, Don Carmichael, Michael Charneski, Eric Chiappinelli, Crystal Crawford, Sid DeLong, Deborah Dowd, Joel Eichengrun, David Engdahl, Ann Enquist,
William Francisco, Sheldon Frankel, George Hauck, Thomas Holdych, Betsy Hollingsworth, Marci Kelly, John La Fond, Raven Lidman, Deborah Maranville, John Mitchell,
Michael Newcity, George Nock, Laurel Oates, William Oltman, Marsha Pechman, J.
Thomas Richardson, J. Chris Rideout, Wallace Rudolph, Irene Scharf, Pierre Schlag,
Richard Settle, Barry Shanks, David Skover, Anita Steele, John Strait, Andrew Walkover, and John Weaver.

Expert and Novice Thinking
I. Why Can We Do What We Do With Such Ease, While Our Students
Struggle?
A. How People Understand: Cognitive Psychology and Schema Theory
Decades ago, cognitive psychologists maintained that understanding
involved more than a direct response to a particular perceived stimulus. It
required a patterning of the various elements of the experience into a
structure or "scheme."3 Cleaned up and polished by current experts in
artificial intelligence, psychology, educational psychology, linguistics, mathematics, rhetoric, computer science, logic, and education, the notion has
reemerged as "schema theory." Put simply, "schemata" are interpretive
frameworks, built out of past knowledge and experience, that allow us to
make sense out of the bits and pieces of information presented to us in
given situations.
To perceive something is to place a construction upon it that plausibly accounts
for the sensory input. To comprehend a message is to discover a formulation
which coherently explains its contents. Mundane acts of perception and compreso smoothly that we are unaware of the process of formulation
hension proceed
4
and checking.

Most significantly, the schema supplies elements that are not literally
included in the experience (or "message" or "text").
The meaning is not in the message. A message is a cryptic recipe that can guide
a person in constructing a representation. The representation which accounts for
a message will usually include elements that are not explicitly contained in the
message. These imported elements will be the ones required to maintain consistency with the schemata from which the representation is built, in just the same5
sense that recognition of a cube requires one to assume faces that cannot be seen.

In fact, "[w]ithout some schema into which it can be assimilated, an
experience is incomprehensible and, therefore, little can be learned from
it.,,6

A cube is a simple example. Where do those sides you "see" but cannot

possibly really observe come from? We know they are there (though we
could be fooled by a pseudocube constructed in the manner of a hotel on

the set of a 7Hollywood movie). We infer them from prior knowledge and
experience.
Think about driving. While riding down the street, the beginning driver
catches a glimpse of a car sitting in a driveway, with exhaust flowing from
the tailpipe. The driver is talking to a friend, who is standing next to the car.
To the beginner, it is just someone chatting, nothing worthy of notice. You,
3. See generally Jean Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child (London, 1952);
Jean Piaget & Barbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child (New York, 1969);
Wolfgang K6hler, The Mentality of Apes (New York, 1925); Edwin G. Boring, A History
of Experimental Psychology, ch. 23, 2d ed. (New York, 1950); cf. Noam Chomsky,
Syntactic Structures (Hague, 1957).
4. Anderson, supra note 2, at 419.
5. Id. at 422.
6. Id. at 429.
7. Cf. Emily Calhoun, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 34 J. Legal Educ. 507, 508 (1984):
"Bronowski begins his lectures with a discussion of inference. He contends that
'inferences are . . . at the root of all our mental process.' Even visual perception
depends on an inferential process."
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on the other hand, do focus on the scene. You have seen a driver in such
a situation wave goodbye to the friend and in one motion back out without
looking. You therefore "see" a whole set of meanings and significances that
the beginner does not see. You prepare to stop suddenly if necessary.
Now, consider a legal example. You are sitting in a room with a group
of people who are novices in legal matters. One person says, "Did you hear
about poor Smith? Hit crossing the street. An ambulance came for him and
started to take him to the hospital but the driver was totally drunk. Crashed
into a parked car, killing Smith in the process." If the conversation then
turns to who is in trouble, most of the participants are likely to focus on the
drunken ambulance driver, with some adding that the original driver who
hit Smith is probably also somewhat to blame. You, however, "see" other
possibilities that are not in the fact statement. The ambulance company
may be liable (respondent superior, negligent hiring, negligent supervision). Additionally, whether the original driver's negligence is the proximate cause of Smith's death will be an issue. Depending on the results of
that analysis, the original driver or the ambulance driver may not be liable.
Further, you would want to investigate to determine whether there may be
a question of "but for" causation in the crash of the ambulance. An axle
may have broken, and therefore the same accident would have resulted
even if the ambulance driver had been sober. And so on.8 Segue to expert
versus novice thinking.
B. Relationship of Schema Theory to Expert Versus Novice Thinking
One way of analyzing "intelligent" thinking may be a bit upsetting for
some:
It is by no means obvious that very smart people are that way directly because of
the superior power of their general methods-as compared with average people .... A very intelligent person might be that way because of specific local
features of his knowledge-organizing knowledge rather than because of global
qualities of his "thinking." 9

The same appears to be true of experts. Achieving expertise may involve
the accumulation of certain types of experiences rather than cognitive
growth or change. In other words, experts know a lot-language, procedures, analogies, historical debates in their areas-all of which give them an
expert "schema" from which to approach a problem, processing information in ways a novice cannot.' 0
As legal "experts," we approach legal problems with a great deal of
"domain-based" knowledge. We possess a vast array of information about
law and its processes: legal vocabulary; cases; use of analogies; character8. An early word of caution. Examples such as this one can be helpful because they give
content to an idea. They can also be misleading because they limit a broader idea to the
narrow confines of the particular example. This example principally involves the
intersection of issue-spotting skills with specific doctrinal knowledge. As will be discussed
later, however, the schema of a legal expert, while including both types of knowledge,
encompasses far more.
9. Glasser, supra note 2 at 98, citing the artificial intelligence (Al) experts Marvin Minsky
& Seymour Papert, Artificial Intelligence 59 (Eugene, Oregon, 1974).
10. Glasser, supra note 2, at 98-99.

Expert and Novice Thinking
istic "patterns" or "moves" in reasoning;"1 relationships between bodies of
doctrine, along with an awareness of general principles and issues that cut
across such bodies; the significant questions and historical perspective in
each of our areas; procedures for approaching problems; knowledge of the
conventions controlling what can or cannot be said. Our "knowledge base,"
more than any unique cognitive capacities we possess, provides us with an
effective framework (i.e., schema) for approaching and analyzing problems. Entering law students ("novices"), however, have no such knowledge
base (although they may well possess a different expert knowledge
base-e.g., as engineers, mathematicians, etc.). Accordingly, they are not
capable of approaching legal problems in the manner that is second nature
to those of us in the "knowledge community" or "domain" of law.
Now the hard question. How, specifically, does this "knowledge base" or
"schema" reflect itself in expert thinking in contrast to novice thinking?
Two sources provide some tentative answers. The first is an experiment in
the social sciences. Although there are differences in the methodologies of
social studies and law, there are some helpful commonalities that make the
experiment useful for our purposes. Both disciplines deal with ill-defined
problems (in both, defining the problem may be the most difficult step),
12
and both rely on informal reasoning (in contrast to mathematics or logic).
The social-science experiment was a rather intriguing one.' 3 Political
science experts on the Soviet Union and other regions, college students in
a beginning course on the Soviet Union, graduate students in the field, and
experts from other fields (chemistry) were asked how they would solve the
Soviet grain-shortage problem if they were the Soviet Minister of Agriculture. The subjects were taped as they worked through the problem, and
their responses were then analyzed. Although there were differences
among the Soviet experts in how they approached the problem, certain
general observations could be made about all of them.
1. The Soviet experts focused on defining and formulating the problem, trying to develop a problem "representation"'14 (just as we try to define
11. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag & David Skover, Tactics of Legal Reasoning (Durham, N.C.,
1986).
12. Perkins provides a very helpful articulation of the characteristics of "informal reasoning"
versus "formal reasoning." See Perkins, supra note 2, at 21. Cf. Karl Klare, The Law
School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left? 32 J. Legal Educ. 336, 340 (1982) ("Legal
reasoning exists primarily as an array of highly stylized modes ofjustificatory rhetoric.
From the standpoint of logic-as opposed, for example, to the perspectives of anthropology or hermeneutics-there simply is no necessity or determinacy to legal reasoning,
no inner compulsion to its methods."). Particularly interesting is Perkins's insistence on
the necessity of imagination for developing the dialectical lines of argumentation that
good informal reasoning requires. Perkins, supra note 2,at 21, 22. For an endorsement
of the importance of imagination and intuition to legal reasoning, see Calhoun, supra
note 7, at 508, 510-14.
13. The experiment is described in Problem-Solving Skill, supra note 2, at 191-212.
14. To solve a problem, an expert constructs a "representation" of it. Id. at 191. For Glasser,
the "relation between the structure of the knowledge base and problem-solving process
is mediated through the quality of the representation of the problem. We define a
problem representation as a cognitive structure corresponding to a problem that is
constructed by a solver on the basis of domain-related knowledge and its organization."
Glasser, supra note 2, at 98.
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the "issue"' 5). Novices plunged right into looking for solutions.
2. The Soviet experts sought broad principles, which were then
applied throughout their chain of analysis and which, in fact, organized
their analysis, while the novices seized on concrete features on the surface
of the problem.' 6 (Similarly, in criminal law, students dealing with the
question of whether there should be an insanity defense will tend to focus
on the concrete feature of "insanity" rather than on broader questions of
culpability and the purposes and legitimacy of the criminal sanction.)
3. The Soviet experts developed extensive argumentation to support
their conclusions, including long chains of analyses dealing with subproblems, constraints, and qualifications. 17 Novices provided little argumentation, and the argumentation they did engage in involved very short chains
of analysis in which no real subproblems were recognized, let alone
analyzed.
What of the others in the study? Expert chemists were similar to novices.
Graduate students formulated the problem in more abstract terms than
novices. (While a novice would say "more roads and tractors," the graduate
student would say "transportation"; experts, on the other hand, would say
"infrastructure."' 8 ) Graduate students also examined some subproblems
but engaged in minimal argumentation. The political scientists who were
not Soviet experts generally were similar to the Soviet experts (though not
with the factual-political-historical richness or depth), except that they did
not come up with a general solution.
Again, what accounts for the difference in approaches between experts
and novices? According to the experimenter, the difference is not in general
problem-solving skills. Both experts and novices applied similar general
skills (e.g., "look for the 'causes' underlying a problem and deal with those
causes"). Rather, the difference between the expert and novice can be solely
attributed to the expert's incorporating an expert knowledge base (schema)
that the novice did not possess.' 9
A second example that sheds some light on the difference between
novice and expert thinking comes from the day-long faculty workshop that
generated this article. At the beginning of the day, the faculty was divided
into groups of five. One group was composed exclusively of professors who
taught in the area of criminal law. (In retrospect, it would have been
15. Of course, by "the issue" we may mean what the decision maker had to decide (e.g., "Is
the contract unconscionable?") and/or some broader conception (e.g., "Why should

16.
17.
18.

19.

courts interfere with private agreements?"). Cf. Jennifer Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An
Empowering Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal Reasoning, 36 J. Legal
Educ. 249, 253-54 (1986) (on "broad" and "narrow" frames).
Glasser came to a similar conclusion from his own work and research. See Glasser, supra
note 2, at 98-99 ("the knowledge of novices is organized around the literal objects
explicitly given in a problem statement").
Cf. Perkins, supra note 2, at 21 (good informal arguments generally require some
"hedging").
The experts' use of hierarchical classifications permit both memory storage and
retrieval. See Problem-Solving Skill, supra note 2, at 206-07. Cf. Glasser, supranote 2, at
98-99 ("Experts' knowledge. . . . is organized around principles and abstractions that
subsume these objects").
Problem-Solving Skill, supra note2, at 204-08. See also Glasser, supra note 2, at 98-99.
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interesting to have included a group of students.) The groups were each
given a criminal-law-based fact pattern and were instructed on the approach they were to take in their analysis.2 0 In a sequence of exercises, the
faculty members worked on the analysis individually, discussed it in their
groups, and then worked alone on the question, "What did you do when
you analyzed the fact pattern?" 2' They discussed the "mental processes"
analysis in their groups and then reported their various thoughts and
perceptions in a full faculty discussion. The results are interesting but
20. Your dean has taken you aside and told you the following:
"I'm in a real jam and need you to help me out. Professor Glib, who teaches the
large section of criminal law, just called me this morning to tell me he's decided
to retire. Now, I don't remember if you've ever taught criminal law before or if
your last contact with the subject was in law school, but class starts tomorrow and
I want you to teach it . . . One other thing. The text books have not arrived at
the bookstore yet, and there are no treatises or outlines either. All we have is a
short fact pattern concerning the exploits of a young woman named Cynthia.
Anyway, you're an expert in legal analysis, so you should have no problem. Good
luck... "
Thanks Dean, you think, and return to your office to prepare. Eventually, you must
determine how you will present the material to the class. But first you want to analyze
the fact pattern for yourself.
For this exercise focus only on your analysis. Specifically, analyze what, in plausible
theory, Cynthia's criminal liability could be, and then, what it should be. Do not concern
yourself with what it would be in any current jurisdiction. And, again, do not worry at this
time about how you would actually teach the class; just concern yourself with your
analysis.

FACT PATTERN
Cynthia Brandon is going to be charged with an "assault with the intent to commit
murder." I just talked to the D.A. Cynthia is 20 years old, and apparently went berserk
at a fraternity party, bashing in the head of her boyfriend, Carl Allen, with a wine bottle
when he tried to restrain her. I just talked to our client's brother when I arranged the
bail. Cynthia was too sedated to talk to me. According to the brother, Cynthia had been
given two marijuana joints at the party by an acquaintance, Eddie Climpson, who told
her that it was "real strong grass." Our client, who apparently is a regular marijuana
user, went outside and smoked a joint and a half by herself. She remembers beginning
to feel "weird" but doesn't remember any more of the day's events. Apparently, thejoints
had been heavily laced with Angel Dust (PCP).
21. Now, think about your methodology for approaching this analysis, and see if you can begin
to become aware of your mental processes (not an easy task):
1. What was the first thing(s) you did/thought about when you read through the
hypo?
What words did you focus on?
What do you think you were trying to do?
2.

Did you recognize the problem(s) involved from past knowledge?
What was this knowledge?
Where did it come from?

3. Did you use prior doctrinal knowledge, analogies, general statements of legal
values (e.g., "legal rules must provide clear guidelines"), some general theories
about this area of law (e.g., "criminal liability must be based upon individual
culpability which, in turn, requires meaningful choice"), something else or in
addition?
Specify...
Where did these things come from?
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hardly lay claim to being scientific. The exercise, however, was simply
meant to aid us in the difficult task of gaining insight into what we do.
Although the criminal law or "expert" group approached the problem in
a number of different ways, each approach had common characteristics.
The group members had all previously developed methods of analyzing the
problem, which they quickly applied. They simultaneously incorporated
both the problem "representation" and the broad organizing principles
characteristic of the Soviet grain experts. Although the lines of argumentation that appeared to be built into their method were generally not fully
articulated (perhaps because the other experts in the group already knew
the arguments), they were readily capable of such articulation if asked. One
member started analysis with an overarching conception of the criminal law
based on notions of culpability and free will and then quickly analyzed the
problem within this structure. Another member had a fully developed
structure for dealing with such problems, including accompanying lines of
argumentation, and merely plugged the facts into the calculus. Another
went quickly back and forth between knowledge of the doctrine that was
used to define the problem and the general purposes and policies that, in
his view, govern the criminal law. A final "expert" immediately saw whole
"patterns" of issues and arguments involving intoxication and spent the
time weaving together the patterns into a whole, using his perceptions of
the purposes of the criminal law. In short, the experts "saw"-or could
construct-a coherent whole that was triggered by and transcended the
facts, into which the facts could be fit to arrive quickly at an overall solution.
In addition to working quickly, the expert group worked with apparent
ease and enjoyment.
Of course, like the political scientists who were not experts on the Soviet
Union, the law faculty nonexperts were also really experts. They knew their
task and what an analysis should look like. They knew that they should look
for broad policies, make pro and con arguments, match facts to "elements,"
look for defenses. And, to some extent, they achieved this. In some
significant sense, however, their approaches were overall a bit haphazard.
They were not sure where to start; many felt confused without a framework
within which to process the information. They tended to focus on the more
concrete, surface features of the problem, like the nonexperts in the Soviet
grain problem. People, after all, deal with what they "see," and, unlike the
experts, the surface was principally what they saw. They focused on the
criminal charge. They "collected" bits and pieces of criminal law from their
memories and tried to piece them together with the facts. They went from
known categories such as mens rea and looked for general policies but were
not completely clear where to put the results of their analysis. Some even
analyzed the problem in terms of what they found to be "fair" in this
particular case or based their analysis on a legal structure from a subject
area more familiar to them. Thus one member reconstructed the problem
into an evidence problem: "It's all inadmissible hearsay. No liability."
Overall their work was difficult, slow, and for many seemed to promote
anxiety (one group acknowledged "total panic" when they first began their
analysis).

Expert and Novice Thinking
Like the political scientists who were not Soviet experts, the nonexperts
in our exercise knew what they should be doing but were faced with a
number of pieces (facts, doctrine, policy) that they did not seem to be able
to fit together easily so as to form a solution. They were not lacking in
analytic ability; they simply did not know enough.
Out of the groups' experiences, the law faculty members at the University of Puget Sound came up with the following tentative ideas, speculations, and perceptions, based on the theory that the difference in expert
and novice performance is accounted for by the difference in expert and
novice schema.
Idea 1: Start With the Novice's Schema, Then Work Towards Ours
Professors seem to be telling students, "Here I am, see if you can get
here." If, however, thinking like an expert is principally a function of
adding general reasoning skills to a vast, complex expert knowledge base or
schema, we might focus more on students' existing schemata and build
from their world to ours, articulating how our schemata converge and
diverge from theirs. 22 Such an effort would be facilitated if we began to
recognize that nothing is "obvious," that behind every obvious concept is a
complex set of assumptions, historical knowledge, and mental procedures.
Think, for example, about how much underlying knowledge and understanding is required for one to "simply" state the holding for a case-Lochner v. New York, McPhersonv. Buick, any case. As another example, consider
the standard of review that an appellate court uses when it reviews a jury
verdict for "sufficiency" of the evidence. We all know that this involves a
legal determination ("no reasonable juror . . .") rather than the appellate
judges' personal views on how they would have decided the case. We are
surprised when our students fail in class discussion to apply such an obvious
concept even though it appears in their notes and may have been
committed to memory early in the semester. Underlying the "obvious"
concept, however, is an entire body of ideas about the theoretical relationship between the trial and appellate courts, issues of competency (e.g., the
appellate court is generally not in a position to judge credibility), matters of
policy (e.g., we do not want citizens serving on juries to think that the results
of their efforts to reach a verdict can be routinely second-guessed), and so
on. (Of course, depending on the course and available time, many teachers
would delve into the ideas that underlie this aspect of appellate review
when they first introduce the concept.)
22. Similar suggestions are made by Glasser, supra note 2, at 101; James Boyd White,
Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School Ought (And Ought Not) To
Be, 36J. Legal Educ. 155, 164-65 (1986) (begin with analogies that are drawn from the
students' everyday lives). Of course, even the traditional law professor (at least the good
one) begins with a hypothetical that is likely to reflect some part of the world with which
the student is familiar ("imagine you're looking to buy a dependable used car"). See also
Bergman, Sherr &Burridge, supra note 1 (present students with everyday situations that
are analogous to the legal situation the instructor wants to discuss; e.g., first have
students interview for a companion on a trip as a prelude to working on formal voir dire,
id.
at 547).
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Idea 2: Employ Techniques to Determine the Novice's Schemata
If we want to begin where the students are rather than make them begin
where we are, how can we determine what they are "seeing" when they
encounter problems in our world? There seem to be a number of
techniques that could be used to get a sense of their existing schemata. Ask
them directly. Or try more indirect means: require student journals; take
five minutes at the beginning of class for students to write their thoughts on
a topic and five minutes at the end to write their thoughts after it has been
discussed. We should ask ourselves, "In order to give that answer, how must
this student see the world of the legal domain?" Early in the semester let
students ramble on and only ask "why" questions to collect data that expose
their assumptions about law, the texts (cases, statutes, etc.) with which they
come in contact, and the subject area; use Socratic questioning to locate
areas in which they have a general "problem" in analysis.
Idea 3: Provide a Series of Tentative Structures
Even in our own faculty exercises, confusion was engendered when
nonexperts lacked a structure for dealing with the disparate information
involved in solving a legal problem. The experts, of course, either quickly
constructed a sufficiently expansive structure or already had a sophisticated
template in their heads. Although students cry out for such a structure, we
cannot really provide it. First, it would not make sense to them if we gave
it, because it would be a "code" representing a complex mental process of
selection and analysis. Second, "putting it all together" (usually at exam
time) is one of the more significant learning experiences in their education.
We could, however, initially provide a very simple provisional structure,
break down the structure, and replace it with a more sophisticated one, and
so on. 23 Then the students would always have a structure within which to
operate.
Idea 4: Recognize That You May Be Inadvertantly "Hiding the Ball"
Schema theory provides two insights into this constant student refrain.
Some professors have a "private schema" in their subject area that they
never reveal to their students (e.g., antitrust is to be analyzed as a tort, or
antitrust is to be analyzed purely as an economic problem). All their
questions and attacks are based on this undisclosed, value-referenced
structure. Thus, students keep getting the sense that somewhere, lurking
under all of this, is "an answer." (Of course, for the professor, there really
is.) This kind of professor, however, is probably the exception. A more
common cause of the "hidden ball" may come from the very nature of
expertise. The expert's schema provides elements that are not literally on
the surface of the problem statement. The novice, however, only sees the
concrete surface elements. For example, in class the professor posits a
23. This parallels a suggestion made in Glasser, supra note 2, at 101, that we "provide a
beginning knowledge structure . . . by teaching temporary models as scaffolds for newv
information."
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contract between A and B, adding that now B claims that she was joking.
While students grapple with "it isn't fair to A, he thought it was serious" and
"it isn't fair to B, she was joking," with perhaps a little "I don't believe B"
thrown in, the professor sits comfortably back with the full historical debate
between the objective and subjective theories of contracts in mind. Without
exposure to the objective and subjective theories of contracts, there is of
course no reason for the students to think that the professor's questions
pertain to anything other than joke contracts. If the assigned textual
materials do not refer to the theories, the students do not have enough
information to come up with the type of answers the teacher seeks,
although (in theory perhaps) if they think long enough, they might be able
to arrive at the analysis-maybe. Therefore, as a check, the professor may
want from time to time to ask him or herself, "Is it really in the case?"
Idea 5: Fill in the Students' Knowledge Base
The suggestions that follow assume that although students will generally
work through analyses on their own, the professor might with some
regularity provide students with necessary background information. Ask
yourself, "What do I know that is not in the text that they will need to
answer the types of questions I intend to ask?" Thus, in a discussion of FAA
regulation in an administrative law or regulated industries class, you may
want to provide both information about the regulated industry (i.e., the
airlines) and some general history about government regulation of the
transportation industry. At other times, you might do a sample analysis for
the students, articulating the multiple elements of your knowledge base
(facts, procedures, analogies, etc.) that you needed to incorporate in order
to analyze the problem fully. This will also let students "see" what an expert
analysis looks like. Finally, you could "brainstorm" with your class through
an entire area of law (e.g., third-party beneficiary) before looking at any
texts. (This will also reinforce the students' ability to use their imaginations,
an ability some find central to the sort of "informal reasoning" we use in
law. 24) Throughout the exercise, you could supply information from your
knowledge base as needed to keep the exercise progressing. At an appropriate point in the exercise you could interject, for instance, "Courts in this
area have usually done such and such. Can you see why? What effect would
this line of decisions have on your previous analysis?" By the conclusion of
this exercise, you should have filled in a full "grid" or "map" of the area
with various approaches, consequences of each approach, arguments for
and arguments against (involving a variety of levels of argument-policy,
practical, common experience, human behavior, use of rules, counter
examples, and so forth). You can then begin analysis of the cases in the
area. All the "moves" in response to your questions should be apparent
from the grid or map, and students will be able both to "see" what a fully
developed schema looks like and to appreciate what it means to have such
a structure for dealing with an area. More simply, you can provide
information about the knowledge base of your subject area by choosing a
case book that is filled with explanatory materials.
24. See supra note 12.
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Idea 6: Point Out Recurring Patterns of Reasoning
Legal experts rely on recurrent patterns of reasoning, or "moves." When
the opportunity presents itself in class, the professor might explicitly point
out and label the mode of argumentation or rhetorical strategy that is
involved in particular analysis. Among possible examples are a "bright-line"
analysis (with accompanying list of practical and theoretical justifications) to
counter an individually discriminating analysis; a "yes-but" rhetorical
strategy, in which one accepts the opposition's premises but disputes the
conclusion ("We agree that the pretrial publicity in this case is problematic,
but we do not believe a change of venue is necessary; extensive voir dire for
any pretrial publicity will suffice to insulate defendant from prejudice"); a
"for purposes of" analysis, in which one argues that facts fall under a legal
category for some purposes but not for others ("Although a motorhome
may be a vehicle for purposes of licensing, because of its essential character
it is 'home' for purposes of the Fourth Amendment" 25).
Idea 7: Use Clear Rhetorical Contexts
Novices do not have rich schema to provide clarity for instructions that
are not fully articulated. In class or on an exam, consider providing the
students with clear roles that give them a context for their prospective
answer. Also, make sure they know the meaning of the roles ("You are an
appellate judge" suggests, for instance, applicable standards for decision
making). In short, try to make the rhetorical situation clear so that the
student knows exactly what is expected. Otherwise the student is likely to
respond to surface features of the question and may not find sufficient
information to "fill in" the particular context you intended.
Idea 8: Teach More Doctrine and Doctrinal History
We tend to disparage teaching "black-letter law," priding ourselves on
teaching how to "think like a lawyer" and how to work through theoretical
approaches to our areas. But schema theory seems to indicate that one
needs a rather substantial knowledge base before one can begin sophisticated analysis. Lectures, computer programs, assignments in treatises, and
other methods can provide the necessary doctrinal base.
Idea 9: Reduce Emphasis on Student Evaluations
Let us briefly shift from the implications of schema theory for teaching
to its implications for the evaluation of teaching. Novices in a field tend to
focus on the concrete and find it difficult to appreciate theoretical approaches to a subject. Because students lack a full sense of the field or a
point of reference outside of their own comfort or discomfort, their
evaluations of the quality and depth of presentation seem completely
inappropriate. Although professors can learn how the class perceives them
25. But see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (motorhome a vehicle for purposes of
Fourth Amendment).
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from evaluations, it seems misguided to use them (especially those of first
year students) for any other purpose.
II. Why Do Students Give So Many "Off the Wall" Answers?
As a starting point, we must recognize that our students generally

possess coherent schemata that have served them very well in their lives.
Some even possess expert schemata from another domain. But these are
not our schemata, and we insist that while in our house they play by our
rules. Because we want legal novices to adopt our schemata, we encourage
them to change their own (at least while in our classes). 26 Some understanding of current thinking on schema change may therefore be helpful.
When faced with new information, people normally tend to do one of
two things. They can incorporate the information into an existing schema
("assimilation"), or they may actually change their schemata to account for
and deal with the new information ("accommodation"). 27 When faced with
a significant challenge to an existing high-level schema in an academic
context, however, the individual will tend to resist the change.28 First, the
student may continue to reason from an existing schema and will therefore

give answers that are consistently unacceptable and even "off the wall."
(Recall how in our group exercise, one faculty member converted the
criminal law problem into an evidence problem. Although coherent within
the structure of evidence, the analysis constituted a total failure to deal with
the issues within the schema of a criminal law class.) Second, the student
may assimilate the contrary information into existing schemata. This is
possible because significant schemata possess great powers of assimilation
("The exception proves the rule"; "They're just using technical terms"; "It's
really no different than.. ."). Third, the student may develop an indepen29
dent schema to deal with the new world and keep it separate from the old.
Such a strategy may even give the illusion that the student has actually
30
adopted the instructor's schema.
26. "Schema change is the sine qua non of the acquisition of knowledge as opposed to the
mere aggregation of information." Anderson, supra note 2, at 429.
27. The concepts of "assimilation" and "accommodation" are based on the theories of
Piaget. See id. at 419.
28. Id. at 425-27. Law school is surely the sort of challenge that will provoke many students
to resist. It puts at risk the ways they previously have viewed ideas, what they consider
legitimate bases for decisions, how they think about human relations, etc.
29. In One L (New York, 1977), Scott Turow writes: "mhe law as a way of looking at the
world and my own personal way of seeing things could not be thoroughly
meshed . . . I would have to learn those habits of mind without making them my own
in the deepest sense." Id. at 86-87. Cf. Elkins, supra note 1, at 44 (some students deal
with law school by trying to "compartmentalize" it from the rest of their lives).
30. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 428:
People attempt to preserve cognitive consistency . . . However, the last thing a
person will do is make a fundamental change in schemata. The first lines of
defense are to counterargue within the current framework .

.

. ; to treat

anomalies as the exceptions which prove the rule; or to keep incompatible systems
of belief separated. Driver . . . concluded on the basis of her studies with high
school physics students that "The belief system they use in school to pass
examinations and satisfy the teacher . . . may never be related to that which is
used in everyday experiences."
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The following faculty ideas are based on the theory that fundamental
schema change is difficult and will often be resisted with a variety of
strategies.
Idea 10: Avoid Issue-Spotting Exams
Rather than changing their old schemata when confronted in a school
situation with a new area of expertise and corresponding new schema,
students can build schemata within which to play the "school game" that are
separate from both their own schemata and the schemata required for
success in our expert legal domain. Issue spotting, in contrast to issue
development and full dialectic analysis, is only a portion of the expertise of
legal analysis. One can memorize an outline, list issues, and get a passing
grade on an issue-spotting exam without ever confronting how a legal
expert analyzes a problem. Although issue spotting is an important skill,
tests should also include the types of case and policy analyses with which
most of us fill a large portion of our class time.
Idea 11: Use Schema-Change Theory to Identify and Assist Students at
Risk
Schema theory suggests that two types of student will have the greatest
difficulty in law school. First are those who have a very strong emotional
investment in their previous schema (and do not, for whatever reason,
develop an independent "school game" schema to deal with the tension).
Second are those who come into law school with a "knowledge base" from
a social, political, and economic world that does not adequately provide the
assumptions underlying the policies and argumentation in the various
doctrinal areas. In fact, the two types may well be related-the more alien
the world underlying the cases is to one's own, the greater the inclination to
hold on to one's previously acquired approach to the world. We should,
therefore, watch for inadequately prepared students and, when we identify
them, in addition to providing traditional tutoring in legal doctrine and
reasoning, we should help focus them on "filling in" their knowledge base
with the cultural assumptions that underlie the law. (They should certainly
not be discouraged from questioning those assumptions, but they must be
aware of them first.) Thus, students who are not familiar with the formal,
middle-class commercial world may need to be given an explicit appreciation of the perceived role of private law making in our economic system so
that they can meaningfully comprehend the value courts place on encouraging such private contractual arrangements and the hesitancy of courts to
look too deeply into the fairness of private bargains. Similarly, the young
law student who has never had to lease an apartment-or who has never
even seen a lease-might be asked to discuss the experience with those who
have so that the concept of unconscionable clauses is more than a mere
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abstraction.3 ' Although identifying the gaps in the students' knowledge
base may initially be difficult, if the enterprise is pursued over time,
recurring patterns of knowledge deficiencies should emerge. Some students, however, may possess the knowledge base but psychically resist the
law school schemata; they may want to sort out their feelings in some form
of counseling.
III. Why Do the Skills of Students Who Have Succeeded Elsewhere
Break Down in Law School?
Developmental psychologists find that children (and adults) pass
through predictable developmental stages.3 2 Basing his theory on this body
of work, Joseph Williams3 3 has developed an analysis that is helpful in

understanding the movement of novices as they pass into and through a
community of expertise such as law school. Unlike the clear, continual path
of growth posited by his developmental predecessors, however, Williams
sees acculturation as a recurring process, repeated each time we enter a new
expert community (or even a new subspeciality of that community).
According to Williams, when novices enter an unfamiliar expert "knowledge community" (i.e., a group that shares a common knowledge base),
they experience a significant degeneration of their existing skills, such as
the ability to produce dear, logical writing or even to apply commonsense
reasoning to solve a problem. There is simply too much that is new to be
assimilated all at once, and their old skills suffer. Perhaps also, as we see
with beginning law students, novices begin to lose confidence in their
reasoning abilities during the initial acculturation process-and no one can
think clearly without self-confidence. Acute trauma routinely accompanies
the process of trying to assimilate the vast expert knowledge base of which
34
novices only grasp unconnected bits and pieces.
According to Williams, novices pass through developmental stages
analogous to those research psychologists find for the cognitive development of children. Novices thus begin again at the stage of concrete mental
processes and only later become capable of abstraction and mental fluency.
(Note that such a focus on the "concrete" aspects of a problem characterized the nonexperts in both the Soviet grain experiment and our law school
exercise.) Williams-reformulating the developmental frameworks of the
cognitive psychologists Kohlborg, Perry, and Piaget-posits three stages in
31. My thanks to Pierre Schlag for the lease example.
32. See discussion of developmentalists Erikson, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Perry in Elkins, supra
note 1, at 30 n.9. For an argument disputing the applicability of Kohlberg's theory of
moral development to women, see Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge,
Mass., 1982).
33. Professor Williams of the University of Chicago was the main presenter at the faculty
workshop. See supra note 2.
34. A brief observation on law students as novices is in order. Law students enter at the
graduate level and therefore receive training that focuses on high-level problem-solving
skills. Unlike any other graduate discipline of which I am aware, however, most law
students have virtually no undergraduate exposure to the vast underlying knowledge
base of the legal community. (Compare graduate students in history, chemistry,
mathematics, engineering, or medicine.)
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the novice's journey of acculturation into an unfamiliar expert knowledge
community: presocialized, socialized, postsocialized. "Presocialized" conjures up the image of most first-year students35; socialized, that of many
third year students and young attorneys; and postsocialized, with that of
very good, experienced attorneys.3 6 In fact the principal force of his ideas
for law school teaching comes, I believe, from the fact that what he
37
describes comports with what we actually see in our students.
In the presocialized stage, the student is primarily aware of what is
concretely experienced. (So, in law school students string together blackletter law terms when responding to questions in class-they grab on to
whatever is most accessible.) The student has no easy sense of local
conventions, tacit understandings, principles, or assumptions. The student
also lacks a working knowledge of the history of a field and its debates.
Overall, the student is probably insecure and therefore likely to overcompensate, to seek unequivocal knowledge, and to avoid ambiguity or
uncertainty. In class, the student wants the law professor to provide the
"answer." To return to our example of the drunk ambulance driver and the
unfortunate Mr. Smith,38 the presocialized student's analysis of the liability
of the original driver might be: "No proximate cause because of intervening
cause of ambulance driver being drunk."
In the socialized stage, the students is able to behave in accord with
conventions, tacit understandings, and principles but is perhaps unable to
articulate them. The student possesses a working knowledge of the history
of the subject matter and its debates. Further, the student is able to "sound"
like an insider and knows what to say and, perhaps more importantly, what
not to say. Socialized students want to behave in appropriate ways, and
because they are able to live with more ambiguity and uncertainty, they are
less likely than the presocialized student to overcompensate. In the ambulance hypothetical, the socialized student's analysis of the liability of the
original driver might be: "Lack of legal causation. Although, but-for cause
exists, it was not foreseeable. Although traffic accidents and even negligent
driving by an ambulance driver are foreseeable, an ambulance driver who
is drunk on duty is different . . . "
In the postsocialized stage, the expert (it is hard to imagine a student
reaching this stage) is aware that conventions are only conventions, not
rules, that principles are only instances of higher principles, and that what
35.

Once in the new culture of "actual practice," with its additional knowledge base, a brief

return to presocialized behavior will often ensue.
36. Cf. Calhoun, supra note 7, at 511 (quoting Thomas Kuhn) [footnotes omitted]:
[Tfhe student becomes "an inhabitant of the scientist's world, seeing what the
scientist sees and responding as the scientist does," only after a "transformation of
vision." When a student "views the situations that confront him as a scientist in the
same gestalt as other members of his specialists' group" and has "assimilated a
time-tested and group-licensed way of seeing," he has acquired a set of intuitions
that are the "shared possessions" of scientists.
37. The developmental description that follows is based on a handout that accompanied
Professor Williams' talk at the November 1986 conference on Higher Order Reasoning
at the University of Chicago. It is slightly augmented for the purposes of legal education.
38. Supra text following note 8.
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is unsaid can be said. Postsocialized individuals are able to articulate all this.
They have a working knowledge of history within larger history, and of
relations of their subject matter to other fields. They are able to sound like
insiders but do not feel compelled to do so, because they value communication over style.3 9 Finally, they are able to live with uncertainty, multiplicity, and ambiguity, and yet they are confident in their choices. In evaluating
the ambulance driver hypothetical, the person in the postsocialized phase
may respond quite differently from those in the presocialized and socialized
stages:
The question posed by this hypothetical could be formulated in this way: Is the
initial driver responsible for the harm that ensues from the subsequent drunken
ambulance driver's negligence? Answering this question depends upon a series of
variables including, for instance, cognitive, normative and rhetorical commitments. On the cognitive plane, the more one sees drunk driving as aberrational,
unusual conduct, the less easy it is to link the subsequent harm to the initial
negligence. On the normative plane, the more one views drunk driving as a
deliberate wrong, a decided departure from clear generally observed norms, the
harder it is to situate the moral origin of the subsequent harm in the initial
defendant's negligence. Finally, on the rhetorical plane, the more the initial
negligence is distanced (temporally, spatially or ontologically) from the subsequent drunk driving, the harder it is to attribute liability for subsequent harm to
the initial negligence. In terms of vocabulary and grammar, the law of torts tends
to treat these types of problems as issues of causation-specifically, the doctrines
of proximate cause. But within and between these various proximate cause
doctrines,
cognitive, normative, rhetorical and other variables play significant
40
roles.

Williams gives the notion of "conventions" particular attention in his
discussion of all three developmental stages. Expert knowledge communities possess tacit conventions that determine the discourse of the
community. 4' The conventions, which comprise one aspect of an expert's
schema, determine how evidence can be selected, used, and presented, and
generally cover what counts as a point, why one point is worth making rather
42
than another, and what can and cannot be said in support of a point.
Novices rarely know or perceive the conventions, but not because
experts are unwilling to articulate them. Rather, experts themselves are
frequently not consciously aware of them-they just follow them. Most
significantly, perhaps, conventions differ from discipline to discipline (e.g.,
a good approach for a physics paper may be unacceptable when applied to
biology). 43 Therefore, there is no "universal audience" toward which we
39. Most of us have experienced sending an article written in simple, straightforward
language to a student-edited law review only to have it returned in formal "professionalsounding" prose.
40. These are the postsocialized words of Pierre Schlag, who teaches a class in torts.
41. Cf. Glasser, supra note 2, at 99: "Effective thinking is the result of 'conditionalized'
knowledge-knowledge that becomes associated with the conditions and constraints of
its use."
42. Perkins sees the general understanding of what is and is not appropriate evidence as a
type of "judgment." Perkins, supra note 2, at 25.
43. For a thorough discussion of the significance of disciplinary differences, see Roger
Peters, Comparing Generic and Disciplinary Critical Thinking (a paper presented at the
November 1985 conference on Cognitive Frameworks and Higher Order Reasoning at
the University of Chicago). On the importance of disciplinary differences for academic
writing, see Elaine Maimon, Maps and Genres: Exploring Connections in the Arts and
Sciences, in Composition and Literature: Bridging the Gap, ed. Winifred Bryan Homer,
110 (Chicago, 1983).
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present our central points. Rather, each discipline (expert knowledge
community) is defined by its goals and adopts conventions that serve its
needs. A student who does not follow the tacit conventions of a particular
community, however, will almost always be penalized, while the student
who follows the convention will often be rewarded in a manner disproportionate to the substantive quality of the student's work.
The students thus must enter a world with new vocabulary, new
procedures, new teaching and reasoning methodologies, as well as unarticulated rules and norms on which they are judged and evaluated. Is it really
so surprising that some experience emotional trauma as they proceed?
The following faculty ideas are based on the theory that novices pass
through predictable developmental stages when they enter an expert
community.
Idea 12: Be More Supportive
Because the law student must simultaneously try to comprehend new
vocabulary, teaching methodology, conventions, information, and rules of
discourse, and adapt to new people and places, the skills they bring to law
school may degenerate. Perhaps we need to offer more support and
encourage greater trust during the initial stages of instruction than we do
now. To foster students' sense of trust and self-confidence, we might even
want to invite them to experiment with their thought processes at the
beginning.4" Although pressures are commonplace in the practice of law, it
does not logically follow that the best way to prepare students for law
practice is to put them under anxiety-producing pressure from the start.
Further, even if one intends to replicate the stress of the courtroom in a
beginning class, the simulation will be flawed. The anxiety of the beginning
law student derives from lack of knowledge and from the confusion the lack
of knowledge causes. The practitioner's sense of pressure, however, generally has its origins in knowing what is at stake and what needs to be done
to accomplish the task.
Idea 13: Simplify Initial Tasks, Then Build
We should perhaps also consider simplifying initially both the number
and complexity of tasks required for any particular assignment, building
incrementally to higher levels of complexity as the course progresses.
Currently, the first case in a casebook raises issues as difficult as the last
(and may not even be in modern English). If novices really do progress
through developmental stages, then perhaps we should follow the elementary education model: start simple, then build. Begin, for instance, with a
hypothetical without cases (so students will not need to deal with the initial
44. According to Erik Erikson's theory of psychosocial development, young children need to
develop trust and then initiative. See, e.g., Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2d
ed. (New York, 1963). This is not to suggest that our adult students are literally going
through the developmental processes of preschoolers; the needs that must be fulfilled
for a child to adjust successfully to the biggest knowledge community of them all-to
"life" as a self-aware being-may, nevertheless, be instructive.
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task of "decoding" the case) and reason through the situation, using their
current knowledge, common sense, and imagination. As they work through
the hypothetical, give them at appropriate junctures a piece of doctrine or
an accepted policy and ask, "How does that affect what we've been saying?"
Similarly, for statutory interpretation, begin with a four-line statute, then
build to six, ten, etc. Do not start with the IRS Code. Finally, recognize that
almost from the beginning much of our questioning focuses on the
"evaluative" level (i.e., making judgments based on internal evidence or
external criteria). The work of educator Benjamin S. Bloom and his
associates on evaluating instructional outcomes puts this last observation
into perspective. It also supports the notion that learning evolves in
stages. 4 5 Bloom's taxonomy contains six hierarchal levels, hierarchal because each successive level requires assimilation of the previous levels.
Evaluation is the highest level (i.e., knowledge, comprehension, application,
analysis, synthesis, and then evaluation). 46 Maybe we should drop back a
few levels at first, and if we will not abide by the adage, "learn to walk before
you run," at least we might feel bound by "learn to walk before you run the
180-yard low hurdles." What we are now doing may be like discussing
French philosophers from untranslated texts with students who are just
beginning to learn the language. (Take-home sets of problems, crafted to
reflect a graduated range of complexity in the subject area, can offer a good
tool for assessing how quickly the students are catching on, and therefore
how fast to progress.)
Idea 14: Recognize That You Might Be "Hiding the Ball" (II)
We have already discussed "hiding the ball" in the context of schema
theory (see Idea 4). A further gloss on the subject emanates from developmental theory. If we are making judgments based on tacit conventions of
which even we are not consciously aware, then it is little wonder that
students believe that we are hiding something from them. Their error then
is not in believing that something is hidden but that we are doing it
intentionally.
Idea 15: Articulate for Students Their Progress in the Acculturation
Process
The "grid" or "map" discussed in Idea 5 can serve an additional purpose.
Once the map is developed, the instructor can focus students on the portion
they should be able to manage by themselves right away, in a few weeks,
and at the end of the semester. How much progress they should reasonably
expect of themselves as they move through the aspect of the expert
community that the course reflects should then be clearer.
Idea 16: Describe Why Answers Are "Good" or "Bad"
Sometimes, during the beginning of the first year, we could give
examples of what we consider good answers-maybe from two opposing
45. See Bloom, supra note 1.
46. Id. at 18.
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positions-and explain why they are "good" in terms of our discipline.
Because "bad" answers may make perfect sense in a community other than
law, we might also analyze them and explain what is wrong with them in
terms of our legal community.
Idea 17: Ascertain and Articulate the Conventions
If we base much of our evaluation on the students' ability to follow the
tacit conventions in legal discourse, then perhaps we should attempt to
ascertain and articulate the conventions for ourselves and our students. We
might also discuss whether law and other fields of expertise maintain such
conventions as deliberate obstacles to entering the knowledge community.
Idea 18: Teach a Subject Area As a Conversational Language
If entrance into a community of expertise involves knowing what can
and cannot be said and how to say it, then the process is similar to learning
a language. One could teach a law course as a conversational language is
taught, by immersion. 47 Talk about cases as you would to practicing
lawyers, slipping in references to facts, tactics, statutes, and procedures as
the conversation proceeds. Provide "vocabulary" lists (i.e., terms that
students must be able to understand, as opposed to define, in the context of
a conversation about the particular subject area). Help students appreciate
the "grammar" of the language. Law can be seen as having a strict grammar
that provides rules for what can and cannot be said. For example, one basic
rule is: No factual information may be put forth unless it can be linked to
some relevant legal structure. The structure itself, of course, may be
derived from a range of legal sources-accepted case doctrine, broad
interpretation of a statutory provision in the light of some general policy, a
new legal theory based on perceived trends in other areas decided by the
court. According to the first basic rule, one cannot say, "The defendant was
drunk" (or bring forth information to that effect), unless one also ties the
statement to a legally appropriate category, such as "it affects the witness's
ability to perceive" (a legal category derived from cases and statutory codes
for evidence rules on impeaching the credibility of witnesses), or "it was
negligent to drive in this condition" (derived from cases articulating the
element of "breach" of a duty of care in a claim for negligence), or "so he
could not form the specific intent to steal" (derived from the statutory
elements of theft and cases that involve the defense of diminished capacity).
A second basic rule of the grammar is: One cannot assert a legal
principle unless one also asserts the condition(s) predicate to relying on that
principle. Assume a jurisdiction in which "unreasonable bail" is prohibited
and in which the only purpose of bail is to assure a defendant's appearance
at trial. In this jurisdiction, one cannot assert that a client's bail must be
reduced under the legal principle prohibiting "unreasonable bail," unless
one is also willing to state the predicate condition that a lower bail could
assure the client's appearance. Likewise, one cannot say, "my client acted in
47. See a similar suggestion in White, supra note 22, at 163.
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self-defense," unless one also says, "my client used reasonable force"
(reasonable force is a predicate condition of asserting the principle of
self-defense). Our grammar has countless rules. As in any language course
taught through an immersion technique, students will be lost for a while but
then should make a qualitative leap in comprehension.
Idea 19: Have Students Write Short Responses in Class
Because the Socratic method, the prevailing paradigm for most law
school classes, is predominantly oral, many law professors tend to overlook
the possibilities for having students write in class. 48 If, however, students
write short responses in class or write very short papers that they bring to
class, their transition from novice to expert will be facilitated.
Writing allows all students in a class, not just the student in the "hot
seat," to respond to the question or problem posed. Writing also allows
students to place their response into a more clearly defined rhetorical
context, especially if the assignment is carefully presented (see Idea 7 on
using clear rhetorical contexts). Writing assignments can also allow the
professor to see what analytical techniques the students are using at any
given point in a course (see Idea 2 on determining the novice's schemata)
and can at the same time permit students to "practice using the language"
of a certain area of law (see Idea 18). Finally, writing may allow students to
better confront the difficult transition from existing schemata to new ones.
Writing allows the students to see their thinking "in front of them," where
they can examine and reflect on it, rather than doing it only "in their head."
The length and kinds of writing assignments depend on their purpose in
the context of the class. The assignments should probably not be graded-their purpose is to help students improve their ability to think in and
use legal discourse, and in most cases they will not be used for evaluation,
as examinations and seminar papers would be.
Idea 20: Provide for the Next Level of Acculturation (i.e, Practice)
Students will experience an analogous process of acculturation when
they move out of the law school community into the community of practice.
Whatever one's view of practice-oriented "skills" training in law school, one
would have to agree that we should not actively mislead students about the
nature of the practicing attorney's schema. Students need to know, for
instance, that an advocate is apt not to ask, "What is the law?" as much as
"What plausible interpretation can I make of this case that will support my
client's position and resist attack by my adversary?" Students should also
understand that advocates use ends-means thinking, starting with what
they need to accomplish for their client and developing their positions and
48. For a discussion of using writing in substantive law school classes, see Christopher
Rideout, Applying the Writing-Across-the-Curriculum Model to Professional Writing,
1983-84 Current Issues in Higher Education: Writing-Across-the-Curriculum, No. 3, at
27, 29-31 (Washington, D.C., 1983-84); Philip E. Kissam, Thinking (By Writing) About
Legal Writing, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 135 (1987). Cf. Teaching Writing in All Disciplines, ed.
C. Williams Griffin (San Francisco, 1982).
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supporting argumentation accordingly. 49 Students should realize that attorneys use law as a "guide" for developing and presenting facts far more
than they use it for trying-as the students have in class-ultimately to
resolve a dispute. Students should appreciate that facts do not appear as the
frozen two-dimensional presentations found in appellate opinions. Rather,
attorneys actively seek facts and develop, characterize, and subject them to
evidentiary objections, and so on.
IV. Come to Think of It, Do We Do Anything Right?

I have not meant to suggest that legal education is seriously flawed. I
hope, rather, that studying and evaluating current learning theories will
help us teach even better. Although we have much we can learn from
others in the teaching field, we have much we can teach. Our emphasis on
students' active participation in their learning, our focus on solving
ill-defined problems 5o (i.e., problems that are a challenge to define, that do
not have "right answers," and that do not possess only one possible
solution), our concern with thinking processes, and our use of questions to
challenge assumptions correspond with much of the latest thinking in
education. In fact, current experts view our principle methodology-the
Socratic method-as a device teachers can use in the classroom to bring
about the adoption of new schemata. 5 1 A dialectic method, because it
employs opposing lines of argumentation and counterexamples, confronts
the student's existing structures head-on 52 and leaves the student no place
to avoid the tension between the competing schemata. Indeed, almost all
the faculty ideas I have presented are basically "refinements" of our
profession's basic teaching method.
Conclusion
.Hardly a social encounter passes, whether a formal dinner party or a
brief conversation with another traveller on an airplane or bus, without
someone asking our occupation. Although many of us will respond "law
professor" or "professor of law," and some "attorney and law professor,"
few if any will answer, "I am a teacher-I teach in the area of law." A variety
of reasons could account for this. We think "professor" carries more status
in our society than just plain "teacher." We think of ourselves not merely as
teachers but as scholars. We teach a profession, not just a subject matter,
49. Analogous perspectives have been put forth by Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal
Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 614 (1984).
50. For a discussion of the nature of ill-defined problems, see RobertJ. Sternberg, Teaching
Critical Thinking Part I: Are We Making Critical Mistakes? Phi Delta Kappan, Nov.
1985, at 194.
51. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 427-28; Glasser, supra note 2, at 101. For an interesting
attempt to formalize the Socratic dialogue into a set of "performance rules" so that
(eventually, in theory) such a dialogue could be carried on by a computer, see Allan
Collins, Processes in Acquiring Knowledge, in Schooling and the Acquisition of
Knowledge, ed. Richard C. Anderson, Rand J. Spiro & William E. Montague, 339
(Hillsdale, N.J., 1977).
52. Perkins sees the dialectic process as one of the main checks on imagination as it operates
in informal reasoning. See Perkins, supra note 2, at 23.

Expert and Novice Thinking

297

Although each of these reasons may play a part, another explanation is far
more rooted in our day-to-day view of our world. We simply identify with
other law professors and, to some extent, practitioners. All too many of us
have rarely thought otherwise, nor did our professors, nor our professors'
professors. We have rarely seen ourselves as brothers and sisters to the
elementary school teacher who surveys a room of miniature chairs and
tables while dressing little people in costumes as part of a history lesson, or
to the high-school or junior-high science teacher who explains why it is
important to keep the beakers dean. The consequences of our failure to see
the connection are perhaps far more significant than the reasons; for, in the
process, we have also tended to cut ourselves off from the dramatically
evolving body of knowledge that pertains to "teaching."
This article is then a call to our profession-a call to take pride in being
teachers, a call to explore the rich body of information about education that
exists in other disciplines, and a call to take this information and from it
develop and share teaching approaches throughout the legal and the wider
teaching profession.

